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SPECIAL EDUCATION/CIVIL PROCEDURE-THE IDEA OF 
FAIRNESS: ALLOWING PARENT-ATTORNEYS TO RECOVER THEIR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT 
INTRODUCTION 

One of a parent's most important obligations is to educate her 
child. This obligation becomes significantly more difficult when the 
child is disabled. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) was enacted to help parents of disabled children ensure the 
best possible education for their children.! Yet, the IDEA is a maze 
of administrative processes, and unfortunately most parents do not 
have the benefit of understanding the required procedures for 
working with the local school system. Although an experienced at­
torney could easily navigate the process for her client, unrepre­
sented parents often cannot attain the best education available for 
their children. When the parent is also an attorney, the rare possi­
bility exists that the parent-attorney may be able to adequately ad­
vocate for her child. However, even if a parent-attorney obtains a 
successful result in litigating the IDEA claim, it is unlikely that he 
will be compensated for the time and effort expended.2 
The current version of the IDEA contains a fee-shifting provi­
sion, which reads: "In any action or proceeding brought under this 
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' 
fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability 
1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-45 (2000» [hereinafter Edu­
cation for All Children Act]. This Act was the predecessor to the modern-day IDEA. 
2. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N. 
v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. 
Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 
1998); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. W. Lafayette 
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996). Each of these cases denied parent-attor­
neys the right to recover their reasonable attorneys' fees under the IDEA's fee-shifting 
provision. The reasoning behind these decisions, which varies considerably, is discussed 
infra, Part II.A. 
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who is the prevailing party."3 Several questions have arisen sur­
rounding the interpretation of the fee-shifting provision.4 
One of these issues, and the one that is the focus of this Note, 
occurs when a parent, who is also a member of the bar, represents 
her disabled child, yet is unable to recover attorneys' fees under the 
IDEA's fee-shifting provision.s This Note concludes that parent­
attorneys who represent their children in IDEA cases should be 
able to recover attorneys' fees because the plain language, legisla­
tive history, and overall purpose of the IDEA support recovery, 
and that the past decisions denying awards were erroneous. 
In Part I, this Note will examine the history of the IDEA, from 
the adoption of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EAHCA), to the Handicapped Children's Protection Act (HCPA), 
and the modern-day IDEA.6 Part I will also examine the Supreme 
Court's decision in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,7 and the ad­
ministrative process of the modern-day IDEA. 
Part II will discuss how courts have dealt with the fee-shifting 
provision for parent-attorneys when faced with the issue. Part III 
will discuss the rights given to parents under the IDEA, including 
the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of those rights in Winkel­
man v. Parma City School District.8 Part III also examines whether 
3. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 
4. There are many problems that have surfaced surrounding 20 U.S.c. 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). See .Kathryn H. Crary, Comment, Necessary Expertise: Allowing Par­
ents to Recover Expert Witness Fees Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 967, 969 (2004) (discussing whether the language of the IDEA 
allows parents to recover the costs associated with their expert witnesses); Keith Grei­
ner, Comment, Judicial Imprimatur Required: Raising the Standard for Awards ofAttor­
neys' Fees under the IDEA in Smith v. Fitchburg Public Schools, 41 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 
711, 712-13 (2001) (arguing that the Court's decision in Buckhannon Board and Care 
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 
(2001), will have a chilling effect on IDEA litigation). 
5. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091; S.N., 448 F.3d at 605; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 131; 
Doe, 165 F.3d at 264-65; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906-07. 
6. EAHCA was enacted first in 1975 in order to give handicapped children an 
education that would adequately prepare them for some form of post-graduation em­
ployment through the use of a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and an 
Individual Education Plan (IEP). Education for All Children Act, supra note 1. The 
EAHCA was amended by the HCPA in 1986. See Handicapped Children's Protection 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400-45). Those statutes were amended several times and are now codified at 20 
U.S.c. §§ 1400-45. They now comprise the modern-day IDEA. 
7. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598. 
8. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007). 
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parent-attorneys are proceeding pro se when representing their dis­
abled children in an IDEA action, a theory some courts have relied 
on when denying attorneys' fees to parent-attorneys.9 Part III will 
then go on to analyze the plain language and legislative history of 
the IDEA's fee-shifting provision to determine how it should be 
interpreted. 
Finally, this Note will conclude that because parent-attorneys 
are not proceeding pro se, awarding attorneys' fees in this context 
does not implicate the same concerns that surround the question of 
attorneys' fees in pro se representation. Moreover, the plain lan­
guage of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision-as well as the legisla­
tive history and overall purpose of the statute-mandate that 
parent-attorneys who successfully represent their children recover 
their reasonable attorneys' fees. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE IDEA 
A. The EAHCA: The Foundation for the IDEA 
Throughout much of the history of the United States, disabled 
children were denied the opportunity to receive an education equal 
to that of nondisabled children.l° Until the mid-twentieth century, 
disabled children were often ostracized, considered feebleminded, 
and "categorically excluded from public schools."ll Not until the 
1960s did attitudes toward both the mentally and physically dis­
abled transform.l2 In 1975, Congress recognized that millions of 
disabled children across the country were not receiving an educa­
tion due to their exclusion from the public school systems,B and it 
enacted the EAHCA.14 The EAHCA's stated purpose was to en­
sure that "all handicapped children have available to them . . . a 
9. See, e.g., Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906-07. 
10. Greiner, supra note 4, at 713-14. 
11. Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 462 
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring». 
12. There is some suggestion that other contemporaneous social trends, namely 
the public recognition of disabled World War II veterans and the civil rights movement, 
contributed to this shift in attitude toward the disabled. Id. at 714. Greiner explains 
that due to the number of wounded soldiers who returned home from World War II, the 
country was forced to confront these disabilities both socially and medically. Id. Fur­
ther, the civil rights movement advocated classroom integration of mentally and physi­
cally disabled children. Id. See generally RICHARD F. DAUGHERTY, SPECIAL 
EDUCATION: A SUMMARY OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, TERMS, AND TRENDS (2001). 
13. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(c)(2)(B) (2000). 
14. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-45). 
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free appropriate public education ... designed to meet their unique 
needs ...."15 This cornerstone of the EAHCA would evolve and 
become engrained in the modern-day IDEA.16 
As part of the EAHCA, parents were allowed to question the 
education provided to their disabled child. by the school district and 
ultimately had the right to an impartial due process hearing to de­
termine whether that education was indeed appropriateP How­
ever, because the original EAHCA had no fee-shifting provision 
built into it, parents who did not have financial resources were 
faced with tough choices regarding legal representation.18 As a re­
sult, parents seeking to recover their attorneys' fees had to do so by 
bringing an action pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act,19 or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.20 Some parents 
successfully recovered under this scheme21 until 1984 when the Su­
preme Court decided Smith v. Robinson.22 
B. Smith v. Robinson and Congress's Response 
In 1984, the Supreme Court heard a case from Rhode Island 
concerning Congress's intent in enacting the EAHCA, specifically 
15. Id. § 3 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). 
16. S. REP. No. 94-455, at 29 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1480, 1482. 
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1), 1415(f)(1). 
18. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. 
19. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 
2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (2000)). 
20. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.c. § 794 (2000)); see also Crary, supra note 4, at 973 n.57 (noting 
that the intention of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act 
was to give courts the ability to assist plaintiffs whose constitutional and statutory rights 
had been violated). This Comment has an excellent discussion of the situation and how 
parents dealt with it: 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prevents discrimination on the 
basis of handicap in a variety of programs and activities receiving federal fi­
nancial assistance, and section 505(b) of this Act provides attorneys' fees for 
successful plaintiffs in these claims. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Robinson, parents had frequently brought claims under both the EAHCA and 
either section 1988 or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, ostensibly to ob­
tain an award of attorney's fees. 
Id. (citations omitted). The real problem was that in order to recover their fees, parents 
had to bring suit under multiple statutes, which raised the cost and complexity of litiga­
tion. Id. 
21. See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 823 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming decision 
of district court awarding parents their attorney's fees based on a Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 claim), overruled by Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
22. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), superseded by statute, Handicapped 
Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1440-45). 
207 2009] THE IDEA OF FAIRNESS 
whether the proper method for obtaining attorneys' fees was via the 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act or under section 505 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.23 Smith arose out of an action to 
determine whether an eight-year old child afflicted with cerebral 
palsy could demand that the local school district, or the state Divi­
sion of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, pay for her edu­
cation at a private school.24 The child's parents prevailed in their 
action in the lower court and brought a request for attorney's fees 
pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.25 The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island awarded attor­
ney's fees to the parents for a variety of reasons,26 but the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed.27 The parents appealed, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit.28 The Court rea­
23. Smith, 468 U.S. at 994-95. 
24. Id. at 995. 
25. Id. at 1000. 
26. Id. at 1001. In Smith, the Court summarized the reasoning of the District 
Court: 
[T]he court reasoned that because petitioners were required to exhaust their 
EHA [Education of the Handicapped Act] remedies before bringing their 
§ 1983 and § 504 claims, they were entitled to fees for those procedures .... 
[T]he court rejected the defendants' argument that fees should not be allowed 
because this was an action under the EHA, which does not provide for fees. 
In the court's view, respondents had given insufficient weight to the fact that 
petitioners had alleged equal protection and § 1983 claims as well as the EHA 
claim. The court added that it found the equal protection claim petitioners 
included in their second amended complaint to be colorable and nonfrivolous. 
Petitioners thus were entitled to fees for prevailing in an action to enforce 
their § 1983 claim. 
Id. at 1001-02. 
27. Id. at 1002. The Smith court described the First Circuit's reason for denying 
fees, stating: 
The court first noted that, under what is labeled the "American Rule," attor­
neys' fees are available as a general matter only when statutory authority so 
provides. Here the action and relief granted in this case fell within the reach 
of the EHA, a federal statute that establishes a comprehensive federal-state 
scheme for the provision of special education to handicapped children, but 
that does not provide for attorneys' fees. For fees, the District Court had to 
look to § 1988 and § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
As to the § 1988 claim, the court acknowledged the general rule that 
when the claim upon which a plaintiff actually prevails is accompanied by a 
"substantial," though undecided, § 1983 claim arising from the same nucleus 
of facts, a fee award is appropriate. Here, petitioners' § 1983 claims arguably 
were at least substantial enough to support federal jurisdiction. Even if the 
§ 1983 claims were substantial, however, the Court of Appeals concluded that, 
given the comprehensiveness of the EHA, Congress could not have intended 
its omission of attorneys' fees relief to be rectified by recourse to § 1988. 
Id. at 1002-03 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
28. Id. at 1021. 
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soned that allowing parents to circumvent the administrative pro­
cess of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) would be 
contrary to Congress's objectives in enacting the statute.29 The 
Court further stated that since Congress had provided that the 
EHA be the exclusive avenue for disabled children challenging 
their education, parents could not recover attorneys' fees based on 
the EHA or other civil rights statutes.30 
Congress's response to the Court's decision in Smith was both 
swift and hostile. It enacted HCPA in 1986,31 including the follow­
ing provision: "In any action or proceeding brought under this sub­
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' 
fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of a handicapped 
child or youth who is the prevailing party."32 With this language, 
parents could now obtain fee awards if they were prevailing party.33 
C. The 1997 Reauthorization of the IDEA to the Present Day 
In 1997, Congress reauthorized the IDEA,34 expanding the Act 
to increase the accountability of local schools, broaden the legal 
protections and remedies available to disabled children, and in­
crease the parents' rights with regard to the educational decision­
making process.35 
Congress also limited eligibility for awards of attorneys' fees.36 
The first limitation made fee recovery unavailable for "attorney 
29. Id. at 1012-13; see also Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. § 1400). 
30. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012. 
31. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.c. § 141S(i)(3)(B) 
(2000»; see also S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 
1799 ("Congress' original intent was that due process procedures, including the right to 
litigation if that became necessary, be available to all parents."). 
32. Handicapped Children's Protection Act § 2(B). 
33. However, problems would surface in attempting to define who is a prevailing 
party. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (mUddying the waters in attempting to define who is a "pre­
vailing party" for the purpose of recovering attorneys' fees). 
34. Congress officially began calling the IDEA by that name when it amended 
the EAHCA in 1991. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, § 1, 105 Stat. 587,587 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 1400). For the 
purposes of this Note, the essential provisions of the IDEA have not changed. 
35. Jessica Butler-Arkow, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improve­
ment Act of 2004: Shifting School Districts' Attorneys' Fees to Parents of Children with 
Disabilities and Counsel, 42 WILLAMElTE L. REV. 527, 529 (2006); see also Judith E. 
Heumann & Tom Hehir, Believing in Children-A Great IDEA for the Future, EXCEP· 
TIONAL PARENT, Sept. 1997, http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSERSIP0IicyIIDEAlarticle2. 
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
36. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(D)-(F). 
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presence at team meetings to develop a student's Individual Educa­
tion Plan (IEP)" and "mediations prior to a due process complaint 
being filed."3? The second limitation made fees unavailable when 
the parent "[did] not provide[] the school district with the informa­
tion required in the due process complaint. "38 These amendments, 
when combined with the 2004 reauthorization, comprise the mod­
ern-day exceptions to obtaining a fee award under the IDEA.39 
Further, § 1415(i)(3)(E) provides an exception to the limita­
tions on attorneys' fees, stating: "Notwithstanding subparagraph 
(D), an award of attorneys' fees and related costs may be made to a 
parent who is the prevailing party and who was substantially justi­
fied in rejecting the settlement offer."40 While altering the lan­
guage of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision clarified Congress's 
intent to create a mechanism for parents to recover attorneys' fees, 
37. Lynn M. Daggett, Special Education Attorney's Fees: of Buckhannon, the 
IDEA Reauthorization Bills, and the IDEA as Civil Rights Statute, 8 U.C DAVIS J. JUV. 
L. & POL'y 1, 9 (2004). 
38. /d. The original text of the bill contained another proposed limitation requir­
ing courts "to take into consideration what impact that award will have on all of the 
students in the district or in the particular classrooms," which was defeated in the Sen­
ate. Id. 
39. 20 U.S.CA. § 141S(i)(3)(D) (Supp. 2008). The statute reads: 
(i) In general 
Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be reim­
bursed in any action or proceeding under this section for services performed 
subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent if­
(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceed­
ing, at any time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins; 
(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and 
(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief 
finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the 
offer of settlement. 
(ii) IEP Team meetings 
Attorneys' fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting of the IEP 
Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative pro­
ceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for a mediation 
described in subsection (e) of this section. 
(iii) Opportunity to resolve complaints 
A meeting conducted pursuant to subsection (f)(l)(B)(i) of this section shall 
not be considered­
(I) a meeting convened as a result of an administrative hearing or 
judicial action; or 
(II) an administrative hearing or judicial action for purposes of this 
paragraph. 
Id. 
40. 20 U.S.C § 141S(i)(3)(E). 
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these amendments did not end the controversy surrounding fee 
shifting under the IDEA. 
In 2001, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Buckhannon 
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health 
and Human Resources.41 In Buckhannon, the Court interpreted 
the fee-shifting provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act42 
and the Fair Housing Amendments Act,43 statutes that have fee­
shifting provisions closely akin to those in the Civil Rights Act44 
and the IDEA.45 In Buckhannon, the Court held that to be 
deemed a "prevailing party" under the fee-shifting provision, the 
party attempting to obtain a fee award must have acquired a "judi­
cially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties."46 
Thus, in order to qualify for a fee award, the parents had to obtain 
some form of court-ordered relief, either by judgment or court-ap­
proved consent decree.47 In its holding, the Court overturned the 
long-accepted catalyst theory of obtaining prevailing party status.48 
The Court took a textual approach in interpreting the IDEA,49 rea­
soning that the common legal definition of "prevail" was plain on 
41. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
42. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 505, 104 Stat. 
327, 371 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000». 
43. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 812,102 Stat. 
1619, 1633 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 36012). 
44. 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b). 
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(8); see also Daggett, supra note 37, at 35 n.186. 
Since the Buckhannon decision, three federal courts of appeal have found that the deci­
sion applies to IDEA claims. See T.D. v. Lagrange Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 
2003); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 552 (3d Cir. 2003); J.c. 
v. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 119, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2002). 
46. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. 
47. Daggett, supra note 37, at 29. 
48. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602. The catalyst theory "posited that a plaintiff is a 
'prevailing party' if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a 
voluntary change in the defendant's conduct." Id. at 601. The Court also recognized 
that a host of federal appellate courts (all but the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits) had upheld the catalyst theory. Id. at 602; see Stanton v. S. Berkshire 
Reg'l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574 (1st Cir. 1999); Morris v. W. Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203 
(11th Cir. 1999); Payne v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1996); Marbley v. Bane, 57 
F.3d 224 (2nd Cir. 1995); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1995); Zinn v. 
Shalala, 35 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 1994); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1994); Baum­
gartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. 
Pulaski City Special Sch. Dist., 17 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1994). 
49. Daggett, supra note 37, at 30. The textual approach argues that judges should 
go no further than the specific language of the statute when making decisions concern­
ing the statute. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1, 25-26 (2006). 
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its face.50 The Court appeared not to consider the policy implica­
tions that would follow from its decision. 
Most courts have agreed that the Buckhannon decision should 
apply to the IDEA.51 However, Buckhannon has drawn scholarly 
criticism from many places.52 The consequences of applying Buck­
hannon to the IDEA were pointed out by Justice Ginsburg in her 
dissent, where she claimed that the Court's limited definition of 
"prevailing party" would provide private attorneys less incentive to 
prosecute IDEA cases in the future.53 While Buckhannon provides 
a significant barrier for some parents wishing to recover their attor­
neys' fees, the complexity of the IDEA's administrative process evi­
dences the necessity of parents being able to obtain and afford 
experienced counsel in order to further the IDEA's objectives. 
D. The Administrative Process of an IDEA Claim 
This section of Part I will examine exactly how IDEA claims 
are adjudicated. Under the IDEA, states that receive federal fund­
50. Black's Law Dictionary defines "prevail" for this purpose as: "To obtain the 
relief sought in an action; to win a lawsuit." BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY 1226 (8th ed. 
2004). 
51. Daggett, supra note 37, at 35; see also Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 264 F. Supp. 
2d 65, 69-73 (D. Mass. 2003); Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 
1331,1340-44 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Alegria v. District of Columbia, No. 02-7126, 2002 WL 
31818925 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13,2002); Luis R. v. Joliet Twp. High Sch. Dist. 204, No. Ol-C­
4798, 2002 WL 54544, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2002); supra note 46 for federal courts of 
appeal that have held that Buckhannon applies to the IDEA's fee-shifting provision. 
52. See Paolo G. Annino, The Buckhannon Decision: The End of the Catalyst 
Theory and a Setback to Civil Rights, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 
13 (2002) (arguing that Buckhannon "discourages the enforcement of Civil Rights"); 
Daggett, supra note 37, at 52-53 (arguing that the future of the IDEA's fee-shifting 
provision is unclear due to Buckhannon); Michael Giuseppe Congiu, Comment, An 
End to Empty Distinctions: Fee Shifting, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
and Doe v. Boston Public Schools, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 979 (2005) (arguing that 
Doe v. Boston Public Schools, a decision which relied on Buckhannon, should be over­
turned); Greiner, supra note 4, at 755-56 (arguing that attorneys' fee awards are neces­
sary.for the proper function of the IDEA and urging congressional action to clear up 
the "prevailing party" controversy); Robert H. Greenwood, Attorney Fees in Special 
Education Cases, N.J. LAW., June 2003, at 56, 59-60 (noting the comments of New 
Jersey special education lawyer Ruth Lowenkron, which suggest that Buckhannon has 
disadvantaged the poor by raising the bar too high to recover fees under the IDEA). 
But see id. at 60 (relating the comments of New Jersey lawyer and long-time child advo­
cate Ira Fingles, which suggest that Buckhannon has had no significant impact). 
53. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Although Buck­
hannon is not the specific issue of this Note, understanding its context is essential be­
cause it has been used to bar awards to parent-attorneys even where such awards 
should have been allowed under the language of the statute. See Matthew V. v. Dekalb 
County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2003). 
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ing must provide the federal government with an annual plan to 
offer special education and to meet, generally, the statute's free ap­
propriate public education (FAPE) standard.54 In addition to pro­
viding a FAPE, schools must involve the parents of the disabled 
child in the determination of what the educational process should 
be55 and notify the parents of their procedural rights under the stat­
ute.56 The normal process of administering the IDEA, assuming 
that there are not any quarrels between the parents and the school, 
involves ten steps: 
1) a child is identified as possibly needing special education and 
related services; 2) the child is evaluated; 3) eligibility is decided; 
4) the child is found eligible for services; 5) an Individualized Ed­
ucation Program (IEP) meeting is scheduled; 6) an IEP meeting 
is held, and the IEP is written; 7) services are provided; 8) pro­
gress is measured and reported to parents; 9) the IEP is reviewed 
by the IEP team a minimum of once a year; and 10) the child is 
reevaluated at least every three years.57 
Whether a child is eligible under the IDEA requires an evalua­
tion, which can be ordered by a hearing officer, obtained with pa­
rental consent, or requested by a parent.58 Once a child has been 
deemed eligible under the statute, the school works with the child's 
parents to create an IEP, which describes the educational services 
to be provided to the child throughout the school year.59 If at any 
point a parent disputes the IEP, the results of an evaluation, or the 
way that the IEP is being administered, the parent can request an 
impartial due process hearing.60 
At the due process hearing, the parents have the right to re­
present their child themselves, to have an attorney present, or to 
54. M. Brendhan Flynn, Note, In Defense of Maroni: Why Parents Should be Al­
lowed to Proceed Pro Se in IDEA Cases, 80 IND. L.J. 881, 884 (2005); see also 20 U.S.c. 
§ 1412(a)(I) (2000). 
55. Flynn, supra note 54, at 885. 
56. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(b)(3) (requiring written notice to the parents); id. 
§ 1415(c) (detailing what the notice must include). 
57. Tana Lin, Commentary, Recovering Attorney's Fees Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 180 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2003) (citing OFFICE OF SPECIAL 
EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A GUIDE TO THE INDIVIDU. 
ALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM (2000), available at http://www.ed.gov/parents/needs/ 
speced/iepguide/iepguide.pdf). 
58. See 20 V.S.c. § 1414(a)-(c); Flynn, supra note 54, at 885. 
59. 20 U.S.c. § 1414(d)(I)(A); Flynn, supra note 54, at 885. 
60. Id. § 1415(f). 
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use a non-attorney representative to represent their child.61 In or­
der to prevail at a due process hearing, the parents must prove one 
of two things: either that the school failed to meet the IDEA's stan­
dard for an IEP, or that the school did not follow the statute's pro­
cedural safeguards.62 If the parents are not satisfied with the results 
of the due process hearing, they may appeal to the state educational 
board's appellate review pane1.63 If the results are still not satisfac­
tory and all avenues of the administrative hearing process have 
been exhausted, then either party, the school district or the parents, 
can appeal to a state or federal district court.64 
The final stage of the process is the court's review of the ad­
ministrative hearings. Courts will usually review due process hear­
ings under a limited standard and scope, giving due weight to the 
outcome of the administrative proceedings.65 This deference recog­
nizes that local hearing officers are usually experts in their respec­
tive fields, and that administration of education is traditionally a 
state function.66 
II. THE IDEA's FEE-SHIFTING PROVISION AS IT PERTAINS 

TO PARENT-ATTORNEYS 

A. The Role of Kay v. Ehrler 
The first step in understanding the decisions involving the 
IDEA's fee-shifting provision as it applies to parent-attorneys is to 
examine the Supreme Court's decision in Kay v. Ehrler.67 Though 
not an IDEA case, Kay is of paramount importance to the legal 
reasoning of the cases that have been decided regarding the IDEA 
61. Id. § 1415(h)(1). The due process hearing is usually conducted by a state offi­
cial. Id. § 1415(f)(1). 
62. Flynn, supra note 54, at 885. Under this standard the IEP must provide a 
FAPE. See 20 U.S.c. § 1402(a)(1). The statute also requires that disabled children be 
given an education that will offer them meaningful opportunities for post-graduation 
employment. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g). 
64. ld. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
65. See Flynn, supra note 54, at 886; see also Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 
1045, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a court should give weight to the results of 
the administrative proceedings); Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 
790 (1st Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (stating that courts must use the adminis­
trative record unless there is new evidence to supplement the record). But see Metro. 
Gov't of Nashville v. Cook, 915 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990) (allowing any new evi­
dence to be presented to the court). 
66. Flynn, supra note 54, at 886-87 (citing Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1052-53). 
67. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). 
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fee-shifting provision.68 In Kay, a civil rights action, the Court held 
that a pro se litigant, who was also a lawyer, could not be awarded 
his attorney's fees under the fee-shifting provision of the Civil 
Rights ACt.69 The fee-shifting language of § 1988 stated, "In any 
action or proceeding ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor­
ney's fee as part of the costs ...."70 The Court decided that the 
language of the statute was not clear.71 It thus turned to the House 
and Senate Reports for clarification of the underlying statutory pur­
poseJ2 The Court concluded that the legislature had focused on 
the need for lawyers to be affordable to the general public,73 and 
the primary statutory concern was to enable civil rights litigants to 
obtain independent counsel.74 Finally, the Court held that a rule 
that would award fees to attorneys who represent themselves pro se 
in § 1988 claims would undermine the stated purpose of the statute 
by discouraging litigants from obtaining independent counsel: 
A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants­
even if limited to those who are members of the bar-would cre­
ate a disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff 
considered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. The 
statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meri­
torious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive 
to retain counsel in every such case.75 
68. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist, 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N. 
v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. 
Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 
1998); Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2003); 
Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. 
Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996). 
69. Kay, 499 U.S. at 438. 
70. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b) (2000). 
71. Kay, 499 U.S. at 435. The Court explained the statute's lack of clarity: 
On the one hand, petitioner is an "attorney," and has obviously handled his 
professional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner. On the other 
hand, the word "attorney" assumes an agency relationship and it seems likely 
that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate 
for an award under § 1988. Although this section was no doubt intended to 
encourage litigation protecting civil rights, it is also true that its more specific 
purpose was to enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of compe­
tent counsel in vindicating their rights. 
[d. at 435-36 (citations omitted). 
72. Id. at 436 n.8. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 437. 
75. Id. at 438. 
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Later courts would turn to this Supreme Court statement for 
guidance in attempting to resolve issues with the IDEA's fee-shift­
ing provision.76 
B. 	 The Early Decisions Involving the IDEA's Fee-Shifting 
Provision 
The first court to tackle the IDEA fee-shifting provision as it 
pertains to parent-attorneys was the U.S. District Court for the Dis­
trict of Maryland in Rappaport v. Vance,77 In Rappaport, an attor­
ney-father brought a claim on behalf of his disabled minor child, 
contesting certain elements of his child's IEP,78 The father, having 
obtained a favorable judgment in the IDEA claim, claimed to be a 
prevailing party entitled to his reasonable attorney's fees under the 
IDEA's fee-shifting provision,79 
The court began by stating that both the legislative history of 
the IDEA, as well as existing case law interpreting the IDEA's fee­
shifting provision, indicate that it should be interpreted consistently 
with Title VII's fee-shifting provision.80 The court then examined 
the legal relationship between Mr. Rappaport and his disabled child 
to determine whether he was proceeding pro se. It observed that: 
"Because the language of the statute identifies the parent with the 
child, and because of the' close, natural relationship between parent 
and child, a parent's representation of a disabled child is effectively 
pro se representation."81 The court then concluded that because 
Mr. Rappaport was acting pro se, and because the IDEA's fee-shift­
ing provision should be interpreted in accord with Title VII's provi­
sion, the logic of Kay applied, and the petition for attorney's fees 
was denied.82 
76. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 
2006); S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. 
Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 
165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1998); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (D. Md. 
1993); Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996). 
77. 	 Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. 609. 
78. 	 Id. at 610. 
79. 	 Id. at 610-11. 
80. Id. at 611. The court cited a Senate report and the decision in Abu-Sahyun v. 
Palo Alto Unified School District as justification for interpreting the IDEA's fee-shift­
ing provision in accord with that of Title VII. Abu-Sahyun v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. 
Dist., 843 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1988); S. REp. No. 99-112, at 14 (1985), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 1804. 
81. 	 Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612. 
82. 	 Id. at 611-12. The court expounded on its application of Kay's reasoning: 
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The next court to examine this issue was the Supreme Court of 
Indiana in Miller v. West Lafayette Community School Corp.83 As 
in Rappaport, the parents were challenging their disabled child's 
IEP on the grounds that it did not meet his educational needs.84 
The father, an attorney, brought the claim on behalf of his son.85 
Miller did not analyze the question of whether Mr. Miller was act­
ing pro se, but merely agreed with the trial court that he was.86 The 
Miller court then pointed out the similarities between the fee-shift­
ing provisions of the IDEA and 42 U.S.c. § 1988.87 The court ap­
plied the reasoning of Kay, agreeing with the result reached in 
Rappaport, and denied the plaintiffs' petition for a fee award.88 
C. The Federal Appellate Courts Deny Fee Awards 
In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided 
Doe v. Board of Education.89 This was the first time that a federal 
appellate court heard the issue whether parent-attorneys could re­
cover their fees.90 The Does challenged the school district's treat­
ment of their disabled son· and were represented by Mr. Doe, an 
attorney, who brought the claim on behalf of his child.91 Namely, 
they asserted that the school district was not providing an appropri­
ate behavior modification program.92 The Does prevailed at an ap­
pellate hearing before the Maryland Office of Administrative 
Hearings and ultimately petitioned the district court for their attor-
It should also be noted that attorneys' fee awards in general provide litigants 
with access to legal expertise they would not normally have. Since Nolan Rap­
paport is a lawyer, such a provision is not as critical. Thus, for the same rea­
sons that pro se litigants' attorneys' fees are denied in Title VII cases, such 
fees should be denied in IDEA disputes. 
Id. at 611. When the court says "for the same reasons" it is referring to the logic of 
Kay. The statement above echoes the Kay decision. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 
(1991). 
83. Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996). 
84. Id. at 905-06. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 906. 
88. Id. at 906-07. The court noted the similarity between Miller and Rappaport 
and stated, "[w]hile the rulings of a United States District Court are not binding upon 
this Court, we agree with the reasoning in Rappaport and reach a similar result in the 
present case." Id. 
89. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998). 
90. Id. at 262 ("No circuit, however, has dealt with a Kay-based challenge to fees 
for services of an attorney in successfully representing his or her own child in an IDEA 
claim."). 
91. Id. at 261. 
92. Id. 
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ney's fees under what was then the fee-shifting provision: 20 U.S.c. 
§ 1415(e)(4)(B).93 The Does argued that the plain language of the 
statute provided for a fee award, but the Fourth Circuit ruled 
against them:94 
The Doe court disagreed with the Rappaport and Miller courts 
that parent-attorneys who represent their children are acting pro 
se.95 However, the Doe court still found Kay to be applicable.96 
The court concluded that Mr. Doe had "obtained an excellent re­
sult"97 in representing his child and that parent-attorneys were not 
acting pro se. Yet, the court denied an attorney fee to the Does, 
basing its reasoning on the "special circumstances doctrine."98 The 
Doe court stated that the special circumstances doctrine was appli­
cable in a situation where, "although a prevailing party should ordi­
narily recover an attorney's fee, special circumstances can render 
93. Id. In 1997, prior to the Court hearing the Does' claim, the IDEA 
reauthorization amended the fee-shifting language, which altered the codification from 
20 U.S.c. § 1415(e)(4)(B) to 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(F). See supra note 37 and ac­
companying text. 
94. Doe, 165 F.3d at 265. 
95. Id. at 262-63. The court reasoned that, in an IDEA claim, the real party in 
interest is the child: 
The adequacy of such a plan is determined by how appropriateiy it meets the 
needs of the child, not the parents. Even the wording of the IDEA fee-shifting 
provision supports the notion that the child is the focus of the IDEA, by pro­
viding fees "to the parents of a child or youth with a disability who is the pre­
vailing party. " 
Though parents have some rights under the IDEA, the child, not the par­
ents, is the real party in interest in any IDEA proceeding. The references to 
parents are best understood as accommodations to the fact of the child's inca­
pacity. That incapacity does not collapse the identity of the child into that of 
his parents. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
96. Id. at 263. The court stated that although Kay was not directly on point, it 
had clear relevance in this situation: 
After all, the central thrust of Kay is that fee-shifting statutes are meant to 
encourage the effective prosecution of meritorious claims, and that they seek 
to achieve this purpose by encouraging parties to obtain independent repre­
sentation. Like attorneys appearing pro se, attorney-parents are generally in­
capable of exercising sufficient independent judgment on behalf of their 
children to ensure that "reason, rather than emotion" will dictate the conduct 
of the litigation. 
Id. (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 (1991». 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 264. The special circumstances doctrine was announced in Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968), and affirmed in Hensley v. Eck­
erhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983), two cases dealing with the fee-shifting provisions of 
civil rights statutes. The special circumstances doctrine is applied when a party is a 
prevailing party for purposes of a statutory fee recovery, but special circumstances war­
rant a denial of the award. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429. 
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such an award unjust."99 The court held that the special circum­
stance here was the fact that the disabled child was represented by 
his parent and not an independent attorney and denied the Does 
their attorney's fees. 1OO 
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined 
the same issue that was addressed in Doe in Woodside v. School 
District of Philadelphia Board of Education.101 Mr. Woodside, a li­
censed attorney, brought an administrative challenge on behalf of 
his child against the school board on the grounds that his disabled 
son's physical and occupational therapy sessions did not meet his 
needs.102 After prevailing at an administrative hearing, the Wood­
sides petitioned the district court for their attorney's fees under the 
IDEA's fee-shifting statute.103 The petition was denied, and the 
Woodsides appealed.104 
The Woodside court took note of the Fourth Circuit's decision 
in Doe .105 After acknowledging and summarizing Doe, the court 
denied an award stating that it joined "the Fourth Circuit in holding 
that an attorney-parent cannot receive attorney fees for work rep­
resenting his minor child in proceedings under the IDEA."106 The 
court offered no additional rationale for its decision.107 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard S.N. v. Pitt­
sford Central School District in 2006.108 S.N. dealt with an IDEA 
claim based upon a challenge that the disabled student's IEP was 
not meeting her needs.109 After prevailing at an administrative ap­
peal, S.N., represented by her father, petitioned the district court 
for attorney's fees, and appealed when that petition was denied.110 
The Second Circuit, noting the holdings of Woodside and Doe, de­
nied the fee award based upon Kay.ll1 
99. Doe, 165 F.3d at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hensley, 
461 U.S. at 429). 
100. Id. at 264-65. 
101. Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001). 
102. Id. at 130. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 130-31. 
106. Id. at 131. 
107. Id. at 129-31. 
108. S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006). 
109. Id. at 602. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 603-05. Interestingly, the court never stated specifically whether par­
ent-attorneys were in fact acting pro se. Nevertheless, it commented that "[w]e ac­
knowledge that S.N.'s request [for fees] does not fall directly within the Supreme 
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The most recent federal appellate court to examine the issue 
and deny a fee award was the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir­
cuit in Ford v. Long Beach Unified School District,112 Ford arose 
out of yet another challenge to a disabled student's IEP; the child 
was represented by her mother.1l3 After a settlement was reached 
between the parties, Ford moved for attorney's fees. 114 
Again, in denying fees, the court ultimately relied upon the 
previous holdings of appellate courts and Kay,115 The court noted 
that under the plain language of the statute, "the Fords appear to 
be entitled to fees."116 Yet, despite the apparent plain meaning, the 
court looked to familiar sources for assistance in interpreting the 
statute's language-§ 1988 and the Kay decision.117 The Ford court 
agreed with Woodside and found that parent-attorneys are not act­
ing pro se: 
Like an attorney appearing pro se, a disabled child repre­
sented by his or her parent does not benefit from the judgment of 
an independent third party. Indeed, "the danger of inadequate 
representation is as great when an emotionally charged parent 
represents his minor child as when the parent represents 
himself. "118 
Although the court recognized that some parent-attorneys may 
be able to provide rational, competent representation for their chil­
dren, the court was "convinced" that a bright-line rule that parent­
attorneys are unable to do so was more faithful to the legislative 
Court's holding in Kay, but nonetheless agree with the Third and Fourth Circuits that 
Kay is clearly relevant." Id. at 604. The court was not persuaded by the attorney­
father's arguments distinguishing Kay. He asserted (1) that parent-attorneys were not 
acting pro se and thus Kay did not apply; (2) there are differences between the statute 
analyzed in Kay, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, and the IDEA; and (3) 
that if fees were denied, it could create arbitrary distinctions between IDEA fee claims 
filed by parent-attorneys and more distant relative-attorneys. Id. at 604-05. 
112. Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006). 
113. Id. at 1088. The administrative history of the case is more complex than 
stated. For those interested in a messy IDEA situation, this unusual chain of events and 
disputes are summed up nicely by the court. See id. at 1088-89. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1090. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1091 (quoting Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 
129, 131 (3d Cir. 2001». 
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intent.119 This bright line rule, of course, precluded the court from 
awarding the Fords their attorney's fees. 12o 
D. 	 The Lone Court to Authorize a Fee Award to a Parent­
Attorney 
The only court that has actually awarded fees to a parent-attor­
ney is the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Geor­
gia. Matthew V. v. Dekalb County School System involved a dispute 
over an assistive technology evaluation made under the disabled 
student's IEP,121 The plaintiff, represented by his mother, a Geor­
gia attorney, prevailed at an administrative hearing, but the admin­
istrative law judge did not believe that she had the authority to 
grant an award of attorney's fees,122 The mother-attorney then pe­
titioned the federal district court for an attorney's fee award under 
§ 141S(i)(3)(B).123 
The Matthew V. court began in a familiar spot, analyzing Kay 
and its applicability to the situation.124 After summarizing the ra­
tionale of Kay, the court noted the decisions in Woodside and Doe, 
paying special attention to the fact that those courts had found that 
parent-attorneys who represent their disabled children in IDEA 
claims do not act pro se,125 However, the court disagreed with the 
result reached by the Woodside and Doe courts for four reasons: 
119. Id. The court stated: 

[O]n some occasions, attorney-parents will provide independent, reasoned 

representation to their children. Given the underlying results, we can only 

conclude that ... [the disabled child's mother] "obviously handled h[er] pro­

fessional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner." Nevertheless, 

we are convinced that our rule-which presumes irrefutably that parents and 

guardians are always unable to provide independent, dispassionate legal ad­
vice-will better serve Congress' intentions. 
Id. (quoting Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991)). The court never specifically men­
tioned what "Congress' intention" was, but noted that "awarding attorneys' fees to the 
Fords would create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever a parent or guardian 
considered herself competent to litigate on behalf of her child." Id. This seems to 
suggest that the court interpreted Congress's intent to have been to create an incentive 
for employment of independent, third-party counsel. 
120. 	 Id. 
121. Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333 (N.D. 
Ga. 2003). The disagreement centered on who would pay for an independent evalua­
tion of Matthew's handwriting. When the school refused to pay for the evaluation, 
Matthew's parents ultimately, after much correspondence with the school system, peti­
tioned for a due process hearing. Id. at 1333-34. 
122. 	 /d. at 1334. 
123. 	 Id. 
124. 	 Id. at 1335-36. 
125. 	 /d. at 1336-37. The court noted the following: 
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First, nothing in the language of the statute or legislative history 
prohibited a fee award in these circumstances.126 Second, parents 
and their disabled children are separate legal entities under the 
IDEA, which satisfies the agency relationship mentioned in Kay.127 
Third, the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct serve as a check 
to any kind of attorney misconduct, like failure to adequately con­
sider the risks of representing one's own child.128 Finally, an eco­
nomic analysis of the situation revealed that a parent-attorney may 
very well be the best attorney available for the cost.129 The court 
held that an attorney's fee award to a parent-attorney is permissible 
based on "the text of the statute, its legislative history, and the dis­
tinctions between the facts here and in Kay."130 Given the differ­
ence in the reasoning between the courts that have decided this 
issue, it is necessary to take a closer look at the reasoning of those 
cases and how the IDEA's fee-shifting language should be 
interpreted. 
III. 	 WHY COURTS SHOULD GRANT PARENT-ATTORNEYS 
THEIR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
This section argues that parent-attorneys should be allowed to 
recover their attorneys' fees. It will begin by examining the 
problems with the reasoning of the court decisions denying fee 
The [Fourth Circuit] first recognized that parents and children are distinct le­
gal entities under the IDEA; thus, it rejected the notion that an attorney-par­
ent's representation of his child in IDEA proceedings actually constitutes pro 
se representation like in Kay . ... The Third Circuit acknowledged that a par­
ent who represents his child under the IDEA does not act pro se; nevertheless, 
the court agreed with the reasoning set forth in Kay and Doe. 
[d. at 1336 (citations omitted). 
126. [d. at 1337. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. at 1337-38. 
129. [d. at 1338. 
130. [d. Unfortunately, the Vances were ultimately denied an attorney's fee 
award because they did not meet the Buckhannon prevailing party guidelines. The 
court summarized its findings with respect to the Buckhannon issue: 
[T]he Court finds that the [administrative law judge's] determination did not 
bestow prevailing party status on Plaintiffs because it did not alter the legal 
relationship between the parties. Moreover, Plaintiffs may not recover based 
on the catalyst theory after Buckhannon. Finally, Defendants' payment to 
Plaintiffs was a voluntary settlement made without judicial imprimatur and so 
cannot support prevailing party status. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled 
to attorney's fees and costs as a matter of law. 
[d. at 1343. 
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awards to parent-attorneys.l31 The analysis will also examine the 
differences between the situations giving rise to the IDEA cases 
discussed above132 and the Kay decision. The analysis will then in­
clude an examination of the plain language of the statute, which 
appears to allow recovery, and view it in the context of the legisla­
tive history and overall purpose of the IDEA. It will then look to 
factors beyond statutory language and precedent, namely economic 
and practical concerns, much like the Matthew V. court did.133 Fi­
nally, the analysis will conclude that the totality of the foregoing 
circumstances-the statutory language, the inapplicability of Kay, 
and economic concerns-mandates a finding that parent-attorneys 
recover their attorneys' fees. 
A. Kay v. Ehrler Should Not Apply to IDEA Cases 
Every IDEA fee-shifting case that has been decided on this 
issue has included a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's de­
cision in Kay.134 These cases can be divided into two groups: the 
early cases, which ruled that Kay applied because parent-attorneys 
were proceeding pro se when representing their disabled chil­
dren,135 and the later cases (after 1998), which held that even 
though parent-attorneys are not proceeding pro se, the situation is 
close enough to pro se representation that Kay should still apply,136 
There are three fundamental reasons why Kay should not ap­
ply to IDEA actions in the parent-attorney context and why the 
holdings that denied fees are erroneous. First, when a parent brings 
a claim that her child's right to a FAPE has been violated, she is not 
acting pro se, as was the case with the attorney who represented 
himself in Kay, but rather she is representing her child. Second, 
parent-attorney representation does not carry with it the same con­
131. See Ford v. Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N. v. 
Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260, 
263 (4th Cir. 1998); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 612 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. 
W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996). 
132. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091; S.N., 448 F.3d at 604; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 131; 
Doe, 165 F.3d at 263; Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 
612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906-07. 
133. See Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38. 
134. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091; S.N., 448 F.3d at 604; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 131; 
Doe, 165 F.3d at 263; Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 
612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906-07. 
135. See Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 907. 
136. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091; s.N., 448 F.3d at 604; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 131; 
Doe, 165 F.3d at 263. 
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cerns about insufficient representation as the type of representation 
involved in Kay. Finally, after the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, 
the statutory fee-shifting language is no longer similar to that of 
§ 1988(b) or other civil rights statutes, and should be interpreted 
independently. In fact, Kay has no applicability to the IDEA fee­
shifting situation and should not be applied as a bar to recovery of 
attorneys' fees for parent-attorneys. 
1. 	 Parents and Disabled Children are Separate Legal 
Entities Under the IDEA 
The early cases, Miller and Rappaport, denied fees based on 
the theory that parent-attorneys were proceeding pro se, like the 
attorney in Kay, and, therefore, Kay barred an award.137 However, 
the statutory rights given to parents and disabled children under the 
IDEA are separate and distinct rights.138 While parents enjoy lim­
ited procedural rights in certain contexts, the disabled child's right 
is substantive in nature. Because of this dichotomy, it is logically 
impossible for a parent to act pro se when challenging the denial of 
a FAPE-a substantive right that belongs only to the child.139 
Therefore, the prototypical situation present in the IDEA cases is 
not analogous to that in Kay, and the holding of that case should 
not apply to the parent-attorney scenario. 
There can be no doubt that parents possess a number of rights 
under the IDEA.140 One such right is the right to sue if the parent 
qualifies as a "party aggrieved."141 Yet, the rights that parents pos­
sess are only procedural and are separate and distinct from the sub­
stantive rights of their disabled children. 
The IDEA specifically sets out the procedural rights of a par­
ent. For example, under §§ 1414 and 1415, parents have a variety of 
137. Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611-12 (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-37 
(1991»; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906 (citing Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-37). 
138. See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994,2002 (2007) (stating 
that the rights of parents and their disabled children under the IDEA are separate 
rights); Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd., 432 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
the "real party in interest" is the child who suffers the "core-injury," not the parent); 
Doe, 165 F.3d at 262-63 (stating that the focus of the IDEA is on the child and not the 
parent); Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (stating that parents and their disabled 
children are separate legal entities under the IDEA). 
139. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2010 (Scalia, J., concurring). Recall also that some 
of the courts that decided the parent-attorney fee award question also held that the 
rights of the parent and the disabled child were distinct. See, e.g., Doe, 165 F.3d at 262­
63. 
140. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2002. 
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000). 
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rights in the development and maintenance of their disabled child's 
IEP.142 The Supreme Court recognized some of these rights in 
Winkelman-for example, the right to have an active role in devel­
oping and maintaining their child's IEP, the right to be part of all 
decision-making processes, and the right to have access to their 
child's educational records,l43 Parents have a long list of procedu­
ral rights upon which they could sue if they were denied the right of 
involvement in their child's IEP and if they were a "party ag­
grieved" under the statute.144 
However, the right to a FAPE clearly belongs to the disabled 
child and not the parent. The explicit overall purpose of the IDEA 
is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to 
them a free appropriate public education ...."145 As Justice Scalia 
aptly noted in his Winkelman concurrence, "[t]he parents of a dis­
abled child no doubt have an interest in seeing their child receive a 
proper education. But there is a difference between an interest and 
a statutory right. The text of the IDEA makes clear that parents 
have no right to the education itself."146 Since the claims in Ford, 
s.N., Matthew V., Woodside, Doe, Miller, and Rappaport chal­
lenged the functionality of the disabled child's IEP, and therefore 
whether the child was receiving a FAPE,147 the legal claims were 
based on the substantive rights of the child, not any right possessed 
by the parents. Thus, the parent-attorneys were not acting pro se, 
and they were not suing as "parties aggrieved" under the IDEA.148 
Rather, they were serving as counsel for their disabled children.149 
142. See, e.g., id. § 1414(d)(I)(B)(i) (parents must be members of their child's 
IEP team); id. § 1415(b)(I) (parents must have an opportunity to examine records and 
participate in IEP meetings); id. § 1415(b)(6)-(8) (parents may file administrative due 
process complaints in subsequent administrative challenges). 
143. See Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000 (listing the statute's provisions and the 
rights guaranteed by them). 
144. See id. at 2008 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Because the rights to ... the various 
procedural protections are accorded to parents themselves, they are 'parties aggrieved' 
when those rights are infringed, and may accordingly proceed pro se when seeking to 
vindicate them."). 
145. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(d)(I)(A). 
146. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2008 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
147. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist, 461 F.3d 1087, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 
2006); S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 602 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. 
Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 
165 F.3d 260, 261 (4th Cir. 1998); Matthew V. v. DeKalb County. Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 
2d 1331, 1333-34 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 
905, 906 (Ind. 1996); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 610 (D. Md. 1993). 
148. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2007-11 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
149. Id. 
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The majority of courts since 1998 have, in fact, found that par­
ent-attorneys were not acting pro se when representing their dis­
abled children when challenging the adequacy of an IEP.150 As one 
district court put it, "no precedent known to the court has held that 
a lawyer who represents his child is acting pro se."1S1 This distin­
guishes the parent-attorney cases from the legal relationship that 
was in place in Kay. 
In Kay, the petitioner sued for a fee award based on the suc­
cessful litigation of a violation of his own civil rights.t52 The legal 
claim arose out of the violation of the petitioner's substantive 
rights, and there was no question that the attorney was representing 
himself.153 In the IDEA cases, the basis for the legal claim does not 
arise from a violation of the parent-attorney's substantive rights 
under the IDEA, but rather from a violation of her disabled child's 
substantive right to a FAPE.154 Thus, from a legal standpoint, the 
representation involved in Kay and the IDEA cases are dissimilar. 
Parent-attorneys are not proceeding pro se in IDEA cases, and 
MiLLer and Rappaport's reliance on Kay was misplaced. 
2. 	 Parent-Attorney Representation in IDEA Cases Does 
Not Warrant the Same Concerns About 
Inadequate Representation as Were 
Present in Kay 
The later cases that denied fees-Doe, Woodside, S.N., and 
Ford-did not base their decisions on a pro se rationale. Instead, 
they reasoned that parent-attorney representation of a disabled 
child in an IDEA claim embodies the same dangers as the pro se 
representation in Kay, and thus, should be treated similarly.155 
Specifically, these courts were concerned that emotion, rather than 
reason, would control the conduct of parent-attorneys who were 
150. See, e.g., Doe, 165 F.3d at 262-63 (holding that parent-attorneys are not act­
ing pro se). Of all the cases discussed in Part II of this Note, only Rappaport and Miller 
held that the parent-attomies were actually acting pro se when representing their dis­
abled children in this context. See Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611-12; Miller, 665 
N.E.2d at 906; supra notes 89-125 and accompanying text. 
151. McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 976 F. Supp. 53, 65 (D. Mass. 1997). 
152. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 433-34 (1991). 
153. See id. at 435. 
154. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
155. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 
2006); S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. 
Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 
165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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representing their children, and that this could be avoided by ob­
taining independent counsel.156 
This argument does not take into account the professional 
rules of conduct of every state that provide for situations just like 
this, namely, when there is a danger that representation may be in­
adequate due to a lawyer's personal interests and emotional attach­
ment to a case.157 The penalties for disobeying these rules are 
sufficient to meet the concern that parent-attorneys will not ade­
quately represent their "c1ients."158 These rules are set up in order 
to regulate conduct among members of the legal profession. It is 
not the role of the judiciary to step in and add additional limitations 
on representation. Otherwise, courts could limit who could appear 
before them in any given context. 
Ironically, these same courts that voiced concerns over 
whether a parent-attorney's representation was independent and 
dispassionate enough to be competent went on to find that the par­
ent-attorneys did, in fact, do a competent and professional job.159 
Thus, not only are the concerns over inadequate representation ad­
equately checked by local rules of conduct, but they are also ne­
gated by the factual circumstances surrounding the various cases. 
While this does not guarantee that future parent-attorneys will be 
156. Doe, 165 F.3d at 263; see also Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091 ("[A] disabled child 
represented by his or her parent does not benefit from the judgment of an independent 
third party."); S.N., 448 F.3d at 603 ("[A] parent-attorney representing his child 'is de­
prived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, 
... formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion,' 
informs his tactical decisions." (quoting Kay, 499 U.S. at 437»; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 
131 ("[T]he danger of inadequate representation is as great when an emotionally 
charged parent represents his minor child as when the parent represents himself."). 
157. See, e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.1 (2008), available at http:// 
www.mass.gov/obcbbo/RPC.pdf ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to 
a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, 
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."); id. at R. 1.7(b) ("A 
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially 
limited ... by the lawyer's own interests."). 
158. See Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. The Professional Rules of Conduct 
in most states provide for disbarment, reprimand (both public and private), and suspen­
sion as discipline for violations. 
159. E.g., Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091 (noting that the parent-attorney" 'obviously 
handled h[er] professional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner.'" (quot­
ing Kay, 499 U.S. at 435»; Doe, 165 F.3d at 263 ("Mr. Doe obtained an excellent result 
for Tom ... and ... we do not in any way denigrate his care and effort in representing 
his son ...."); see also Amy M. v. Timberlane Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-269-B, 2000 
WL 1513769, at "'5 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 2000) ("[T]he School District has pointed to noth­
ing that suggests Chase [the relative-attorney] lacked the necessary independence to 
represent Amy's interests ...."). 
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equally as successful or competent, it demonstrates that bright-line 
bars on recovery based on the possibility of inadequate representa­
tion are not based on the factual history of the cases. Rather, they 
are based on paternalistic concerns about hypothetical conduct. 
Parent-attorneys are not acting pro se when they represent 
their disabled children. Concerns about inadequate representation 
based on a lack of independent judgment are adequately checked 
by professional rules of conduct. Given this, the comparison be­
tween pro se representation in the parent-attorney IDEA context 
and pro se representation in Kay is simply improper. 
3. 	 The IDEA's Fee-Shifting Provision Differs from the 
Provision Interpreted in Kay 
In addition to the fact that a parent-attorney is not acting pro 
se when representing her disabled child, the statute at issue in Kay 
is fundamentally different from the IDEA's current fee-shifting 
provision. Kay interpreted 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b),160 a statute whose 
resemblance to the IDEA has diminished over time due to the sub­
sequent amendments to each. 
When Kay was decided in 1991, the language of § 1988(b) was 
still the same as it had been when it was enacted as part of the Civil 
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.161 The statute read, 
"in any civil action or proceeding ... the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a rea­
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costS."162 This language is simi­
lar to the IDEA's fee-shifting language prior to the 1997 
amendments, which read, "[i]n any action or proceeding brought 
under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reason­
able attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of 
a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party."163 The 
Supreme Court declared in 1989 that the "'fee-shifting statutes' 
similar language is 'a strong indication' that they are to be inter­
preted alike."164 Thus, it appears that at least those cases decided 
before the 1997 amendments to the IDEA-Rappaport and 
160. Kay, 499 U.S. at 433. 
161. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 
Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b)). 
162. Id. 
163. Handicapped Children'S Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2, 100 
Stat. 796, 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1440-45). 
164. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989) 
(quoting Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)). 
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Miller-correctly interpreted the IDEA's fee-shifting language as 
parallel to that of § 1988.165 Interestingly, however, the same year 
that Kay was decided, a district court interpreting the IDEA noted 
that "plaintiffs' motion for fees is based on the ERA, a different 
statutory scheme from that which formed the basis of the Kay v. 
Ehrler decision."166 Clearly, the two statutes were sufficiently dif­
ferent to warrant distinct interpretations by at least one court.167 
In 1997, the IDEA's fee-shifting statute was amended and a 
series of exceptions were added to bar or reduce the award of attor­
neys' fees in certain circumstances.168 By the time the first federal 
appellate court examined the parent-attorney fee award issue under 
the IDEA, the statute that had been interpreted in Kay and the 
new incarnation of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision had little in 
common,169 beyond the template language granting the court dis­
165. However, these cases would still have to account for the fact that the real 
party at interest is the child, not the parent, and thus the parents were not acting pro se 
like the plaintiff in Kay. 
166. Kattan v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 88-0630, 1991 WL 222312, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 17, 1991), affd, 995 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
167. In 1996, § 1988(b) was amended under the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 
(codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b». An exception was added that barred a fee award in 
actions against judicial officers acting in their official capacity. See 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b). 
This exception, which is still in effect in the current version of the law, is not present in 
the IDEA's fee-shifting statute, thus differentiating the two even further. See id. 
168. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 1400); supra note 39. 
169. Read together the two statutes are strikingly dissimilar. Currently, § 1988(b) 
states that: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision ... of this title, the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any ac­
tion brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, 
including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such of­
ficer's jurisdiction. 
42 U.S.c. § 1988(b). On the other hand, § 1415(i)(3)(B), (D)-(E) states that: 
(B) Award of attorneys' fees 
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its 
discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the 
parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party. 
(D) Prohibition of attorneys' fees and related costs for certain services 
(i) Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be re­
imbursed in any action or proceeding under this section for services performed 
subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent if­
(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at any 
time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins; 
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cretion to award reasonable feesPo Certainly by 1997, the two stat­
utes had drastically evolved from what they were when first enacted 
in 1976 and 1986, respectively, which only provides stronger evi­
dence that Kay should not be applied in the IDEA context, espe­
cially when combined with the fact that parent-attorneys are not 
proceeding pro se, and thus any concerns over inadequate represen­
tation are unwarranted. l71 
B. 	 The Plain Language of the Statute and Its Legislative History 
Demonstrate Congress's Intent to Allow Parent-Attorneys 
to Recover Their Attorneys' Fees 
Since Kay should not apply to IDEA cases, it becomes neces­
sary to discuss how the IDEA's fee-shifting provision should be in­
terpreted and why the prior interpretations by courts were 
incorrect. When interpreting any statute, the Supreme Court has 
stated: "[w]e begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction 
that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of 
the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to 
the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclu­
sive."I72 Therefore, the starting point for the examination of the 
IDEA's fee-shifting provision must be the language of the statute 
itself. 
(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and 
(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally 
obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of 
settlement. 
(ii) Attorneys' fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting of the 
IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative 
proceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for a mediation 
described in subsection (e) of this section .... 
(E) Exception to prohibition on attorneys' fees and related costs 
Notwithstanding subparagraph (D), an award of attorneys' fees and re­
lated costs may be made to a parent who is the prevailing party and who was 
substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. 
20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B), (D)-(E) (2000). 
170. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B); 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b). Yet, if this standard 
threshold language were the only measuring stone, many statutes that authorize recov­
ery of attorneys' fees would have to be interpreted in concert. 
171. 	 See supra Parts III.A.1-2. 
172. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980). 
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1. 	 The Plain Language of the Statute Allows Parent­
Attorneys to Recover 
Given the Supreme Court's instruction,173 most courts that 
have decided against awarding parent-attorneys their attorneys' 
fees curiously gave little credence to the specific language of the 
IDEA's fee-shifting provision.174 Under that provision of the 
IDEA, a court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' 
fees to parents who are prevailing parties.175 The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit was the only court who denied a fee award 
despite analyzing the plain language of the statute.176 None of the 
other courts that denied fees examined the plain language at all. l77 
According to the plain language, if the court finds that giving 
an award is within its discretion, it can award fees to a prevailing 
party who is the parent of a disabled child.178 Certainly, all of the 
parents who petitioned the court for fee awards in the cases ex­
amined were parents of a disabled child. Thus, the only reasons for 
denying an award would be if the parents were not "prevailing par­
ties," or if the statutory exceptions to a fee award applied.179 De­
pending on the outcome, there may be some question as to whether 
the parent-attorneys in any given case actually meet the definition 
of "prevailing party" under Buckhannon.180 However, that should 
not serve as a complete bar to the ability of all parent-attorneys to 
173. See id. 
174. See S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 2006) (dis­
cussing only the plain language of the statute in comparison to § 1988 in deciding 
whether or not to apply Kay); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 
129, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting the language of 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B), yet with­
out discussing it, basing its decision entirely upon Doe); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 
260,261-62 (4th Cir. 1998) (disregarding the Does' contention that the plain language 
allows fees); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (D. Md. 1993) (ignoring the 
statutory language completely and looking to whether the provision should be inter­
preted in consonance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Miller v. W. Lafay­
ette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996) (disregarding the meaning of 
the IDEA's fee-shifting language and instead likening its language to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and applying Kay). 
175. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 
176. Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(The Ford court observed that, "applying the plain meaning of the provision, the Fords 
appear to be entitled to fees. "). 
177. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (explaining where the courts that 
denied fees began their analyses). 
178. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 
179. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text for a list of the statutory excep­
tions, none of which apply in any of the cases examined. 
180. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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recover.181 Since the parent-attorneys were not barred from recov­
ery by any of the statutory exceptions, the basis of denial had to be 
due to the fact that the parents of the disabled child were also attor­
neys. Indeed, the court in Amy M. v. Timberlane Regional School 
District acknowledged that, "[t]he only limitation that the IDEA 
imposes on the recovery of attorney's fees by a prevailing party re­
late to the circumstances under which the fees were incurred, [not] 
the status of the person who incurred the fees. "182 
2. 	 The IDEA's Fee-Shifting Statute Already Contains 
Circumstances in Which Parents are Excluded 
from Recovery of Fees. 
The attorney's fees provision of the IDEA includes express ex­
ceptions.183 Given that parent-attorneys are not barred from recov­
ery except under the exceptions, it can be inferred that Congress 
did not intend to bar their recovery except within those exceptions. 
Moreover, § 1415(i)(3)(E) even provides an exception to the excep­
tion, demonstrating that Congress had thoroughly considered all of 
the potential consequences of adopting the language barring a fee 
award in certain circumstances. l84 Therefore, in determining how 
to interpret the language of § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(E), the doctrine of ex­
pressio unius est exclusio alterius applies and "instructs that when 
certain matters are mentioned ... other similar matters not men­
tioned were intended to be excluded. "185 
Since there is already language that bars a fee award in certain 
circumstances it is a reasonable assumption that Congress intended 
these to be the only circumstances in which fees should be barred. 
Indeed, the court in Matthew V. correctly noted, "[i]f Congress had 
wished to preclude the award of fees in these [the parent-attorney 
situation] circumstances, it would have said so in its list of other 
181. See, e.g., Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1338 
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (where the parents were deemed able to recover a fee award but were 
denied because they did not have "prevailing party" status under Buckhannon). 
182. Amy M. v. Timberlane Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-269-B, 2000 WL 
1513769, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 2000). 
183. See supra note 169, which recites the language of 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(D). 
184. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(E) (2000) ("Notwithstanding subparagraph (D), an 
award of attorneys' fees and related costs may be made to a parent who is the prevailing 
party and who was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer."). 
185. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 150 Pension Fund v. Vertex Constr. Co., 
Inc., 932 F.2d 1443, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991); see also RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON 
JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
78-81 (2002) (discussing the phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that 
the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others). 
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exclusions."186 Thus, both the plain language of § 1415(i)(3)(B) 
and an interpretation of the sections immediately following and 
pertaining directly to it, suggest parent-attorneys should be allowed 
to recover. 
3. 	 The Legislative History Supports the Position That 
Parent-Attorneys Should be Allowed to Recover 
Their Attorneys' Fees 
a. 	 The Handicapped Children's Protection Act and its Legislative 
History 
There has been no substantial discussion of the plain meaning 
of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision in any of the cases examined, 
and courts have differed considerably in their rationale for denying 
fee awards.187 Equally true is the fact that the provision has been 
interpreted to allow parents who hire independent attorneys to re­
cover their fees. 188 Thus, the IDEA's fee-shifting provision is open 
to various interpretations depending on the occupation of the par­
ent bringing the action on behalf of her child. When a statute is 
subject to multiple interpretations, the intent of the legislature may 
be considered in order to ascertain the proper interpretation.189 
The intent of the legislature can be inferred from the legislative his­
tory surrounding the adoption of the law.190 Thus, the place to be­
gin when looking at the legislative history of the IDEA's fee­
shifting provision is the adoption of the HCPA in 1986, which for 
the first time provided prevailing parents of disabled children with a 
vehicle for financing expensive litigation costS.191 
The primary purpose of the HCPA was to overturn the Su­
preme Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson, which barred recov­
186. Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. at 1337. 
187. Compare Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609,612 (D. Md. 1993) (denying 
an award because the parent-attorney was proceeding pro se and because the IDEA's 
fee-shifting provision was akin to Title VII's), with Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260, 
263 (4th Cir. 1998) (denying fees due to an alleged similarity to the type of representa­
tion involved in Kay). 
188. See, e.g., A.R. ex reI. R.V. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 75 (2d 
Cir. 2005) ("[T]he parties agree, as do we, that a plaintiff who receives IHO-ordered 
relief on the merits in an IDEA administrative proceeding is a 'prevailing party.' He or 
she may therefore be entitled to payment of attorneys' fees under the IDEA's fee­
shifting provisions. "). 
189. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statu
tory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 10 (2003). 
190. See id. 
191. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 
§ 2(B), 100 Stat. 796, 796 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000)). 
233 2009] THE IDEA OF FAIRNESS 
ery of attorneys' fees by a parent under the EAHCA.192 A 
secondary purpose was to require parents to exhaust their remedies 
under the statute before instituting litigation or trying to recover 
their fees under another statute.193 The specific language adopted 
for the fee-shifting provision intentionally paralleled the language 
of other civil rights statutes.194 In the congressional debates over 
the bill, Representative Williams from Montana stated, "[t]his bill 
provides to handicapped children and their parents the same rights, 
no more, no less, that are provided to all other groups under the 
other Civil Rights Acts of the United States."195 Similarly, Repre­
sentative Biaggi from New York stated, "[t]he whole purpose of at­
torney's fees provisions is to help equalize the balance of power and 
192. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799. 
The committee report indicated that "Congress' original intent was that due process 
procedures, including the right to litigation if that became necessary, be available to all 
parents." It went on to say: 
The situation which has resulted from the Smith v. Robinson decision was 
. summarized by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in their dissenting 
opinion: "Congress will now have to take the time to revisit the matter." 
Seeking to clarify the intent of Congress with respect to the educational rights 
of handicapped children guaranteed by the EHA, the Handicapped Children's 
Protection Act of 1985 was introduced .... 
[d.; see also 131 CONGo REC. 31,370 (1985) (statement of Rep. Williams) ("The original 
bill was designed to accomplish four basic objectives .... Second, to reestablish statu­
tory rights repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the decision in [Smith v. Robin­
son)."). The Court held in Smith that the EAHCA, with its lack of a fee-shifting 
provision, was the exclusive avenue through which claims could be pursued. Parents 
were thus not able to recover attorneys' fees in actions under that statute. See Smith V. 
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1021 (1984); see supra notes 23-41 for a discussion of Smith. 
193. S. REp. No. 99-112, at 15. The committee report stated: 
[N]othing i[n] S. 415 should be interpreted to allow parents to circumvent the 
due process procedures and protections created under the EHA. For exam­
ple, under the EHA parents must generally exhaust administrative remedies 
to attempt to resolve certain disagreements before filing a civil court action. 
Section 3 makes it clear that when parents choose to file suit under another 
law that protects the rights of handicapped children (e.g., section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act), if that suit could have been filed under the EHA, then 
parents are required to exhaust EHA administrative remedies to the same 
extent as would have been necessary if the suit had been filed under the EHA. 
[d. The reference to "S. 415" in the Senate Report was to the version of the HCPA that 
the Senate reviewed. 
194. See id. at 14. The report stated that "[t]he committee also intends that sec­
tion 2," the fee-shifting provision, "should be interpreted consistent with fee provisions 
of statutes such as title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...." [d. 
195. 131 CONGo REC. 31,377 (statement of Rep. Williams). Thus, it seems that the 
court in Rappaport v. Vance (a case decided before the 1997 IDEA amendments) was 
correct in examining how Title VII had been construed and stating, "[i]f the rules re­
garding Title VII attorney's fees are strictly applied to IDEA, Plaintiff cannot recover 
fees as a pro se litigant." Rappaport V. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Md. 1993). 
234 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:203 
to enable those protected by civil rights statutes to pursue the pro­
cedures established by Congress."196 
However, a closer inspection of the legislative history sur­
rounding the HCPA's adoption in 1986 also illuminates another 
congressional purpose: to encourage parents to exercise their right 
to be involved in the educational planning for their handicapped 
child.197 The Senate Report acknowledged this point, concluding 
that parents needed to have available to them all possible remedies 
to advance their disabled child's rights.198 Further, as Representa­
tive Biaggi pointed out: 
There can be no doubt that an attorney's fee provision for 
the EHA which reimburses prevailing parents for fees incurred 
in the administrative as well as judicial proceedings will be a criti­
cal tool for ... parents seeking to secure Congress' guarantee of 
an appropriate education for their children.199 
Moreover, Representative Miller of California expressed the 
need for convenience in order to foster greater parental advocacy: 
[W]ithout parental advocacy on behalf of handicapped children, 
these children's access to a free appropriate public education will 
be further jeopardized . 
. . . Neither I nor others who wrote the law intended that 
parents should be forced to expend valuable time and money ... 
to gain for their children an education which meets their individ­
ual needs.2OO 
Thus, while in 1986 Congress definitely intended for the 
IDEA's fee-shifting language to parallel that of other civil rights 
statutes, there was another important interest in the balance-ad­
vancing the right of parents to undertake litigation to further their 
child's substantive right to a free appropriate public education. 
What is clear is that parent-attorneys, as parents of disabled 
children, should be treated no differently than nonattorney parents. 
Congress's aim of easing the ability of parents to advocate on be­
half of their children applies equally to them. Examining the legis­
lative history of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA will help 
196. 131 CONGo REC. 31,375 (statement of Rep. Biaggi). 
197. See id. at 31,376 (statement of Rep. Miller) ("Parents' involvement in the 
education of their handicapped child is not only essential to the task, it is a right specifi­
cally included in the law."). 
198. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 17. 
199. 131 CONGo REC. 31,375 (statement of Rep. Biaggi). 
200. Id. at 31,376 (statement of Rep. Miller). 
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elucidate the confusion created by these two Congressional inten­
tions and their relation to parent-attorneys. 
b. The Legislative History of the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA 
In 1997, Congress enacted many alterations to the IDEA, in­
cluding a change to the language of the fee-shifting provision that 
added certain limitations to parental recovery of attorneys' fees.201 
The purpose of adding these limitations, and the exception to the' 
exception under § 1415(i)(3)(E), was to foster greater parental in­
volvement in all stages of the process.202 This goal is consistent 
with the statements of Representatives Biaggi and Miller in ex­
plaining the purpose of the adoption of the fee-shifting provision in 
1986.203 
Congress also recognized that one of the goals of the HCPA's 
initial fee-shifting provision was to mirror the language of other 
civil rights statutes.204 As Senator Harkin from Iowa correctly 
noted, any departure from the original language would alter the 
similarity between the IDEA's fee-shifting language and that of the 
civil rights statutes it was modeled after: 
[Senator Hatch, the bill's author,] modeled the IDEA fees provi­
sions on provisions in other civil rights laws. On final passage of 
these provisions he explained that they reflected a carefully 
crafted compromise that provides for reasonable attorneys fees 
to a prevailing parent while at the same time protecting against 
excessive reimbursement. 
201. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 105-17, § 615, 111 Stat. 37, 92 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 1415). 
202. See S. REP. No. 105-17, at 5 (1997) stating, "[t]his authorization is viewed by 
the committee as an opportunity to review, strengthen, and improve IDEA to better 
educate children with disabilities and enable them to achieve a quality education by ... 
[s]trengthening the role of parents ...." The Senate Report further stated: 
The committee believes that the IEP process should be devoted to deter­
mining the needs of the child and planning for the child's education with par­
ents and school personnel. To that end, the bill specifically excludes the 
payment of attorneys' fees for attorney participation in IEP meetings, unless 
such meetings are convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or 
judicial action. 
Id. at 25-26. 
203. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. 
204. See 143 CONGo REc. 8181 (1997) (statement of Sen. Harkin). 
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Let's not upset that carefully crafted compromise. Let's re­
tain the parity between the fees provisions in the IDEA with the 
fees provisions in other civil rights statutes.205 
However, Senator Harkin's point of view was rejected by Con­
gress when it enacted the alterations to the fee-shifting provision 
and departed from the original language of the HCPA.206 Since the 
IDEA's original language was modeled on existing civil rights stat­
utes, any departure from that language must be seen as congres­
sional intent to depart from the parallels between the IDEA's fee­
shifting provision and those upon which it was modeled. 
This presents an interesting dichotomy. Because they were de­
cided before the 1997 amendments were adopted, the Rappaport 
and Miller decisions were correct at that time in interpreting the 
IDEA consistently with other similarly worded civil rights stat­
utes.207 However, the decisions since the 1997 amendment have not 
taken note of the consequences of Congress's alterations to the 
IDEA's fee-shifting language.208 Instead, those decisions relied 
solely on comparing the IDEA cases to Kay, based on the pro se 
representation analysis and the misplaced concerns that it embod­
ies.209 Yet, in the parent-attorney IDEA cases, those concerns are 
without merit,2l0 Thus, only the court in Matthew V. correctly in­
terpreted the IDEA's fee-shifting provision. 
205. Id. Senator Harkin was arguing against an amendment to the fee-shifting 
language already in existence. "I rise in strong opposition to the ... amendment which 
adds limitations on the awarding of attorneys fees to parents of disabled children that 
are unprecedented in any other fees provision." Id. 
206. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(D)-(E) (2000)). 
207. Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. W. 
Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996); see also S. REP. No. 99­
112, at 14 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1804 ("The committee also 
intends that section 2 [the fee-shifting provision] should be interpreted consistent with 
fee provisions of statutes such as title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...."). Where 
Rappaport and Miller erred was in applying Kay because parent-attorneys are not pro­
ceeding pro se. 
208. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist, 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); 
S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 602 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. 
Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 
260 (4th Cir. 1998). 
209. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1090-91; S.N., 448 F.3d at 603-05; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 
131; Doe, 165 F.3d. at 261-63; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611-12; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 
906-07. 
210. See supra Part IIl.A. for discussion of why Kay does not apply to IDEA 
cases. 
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C. 	 Where the Matthew V. Court Went Right and Others Went 
Wrong: Looking Beyond Kay and Outside the Box 
The Matthew V. court was the only court to hold that parent­
attorneys should be able to recover their attorneys' fees under the 
IDEA's fee-shifting provision.2lt The Matthew V. court supported 
its conclusion with four main points.212 The first three are echoed 
in the conclusions of this Note: parent-attorneys should be able to 
recover their fees because (1) the statutory language does not pro­
hibit these awards, (2) parents and their disabled children are sepa­
rate legal entities under the IDEA, and (3) the professional rules of 
conduct serve as a check on inadequate representation.213 How­
ever, where the Matthew V. court truly distanced itself from other 
courts was by including practical, realistic, and economic concerns 
in its considerations.214 
In addition to all that has been said about statutory language, 
interpretation, and applicability of case law, there remains the im­
portant concern that the purpose of enacting a fee-shifting provi­
sion as part of the IDEA was to provide "a critical tool for ... 
parents seeking to secure Congress' guarantee of an appropriate 
education for their children."215 As such, there are basic considera­
tions of economic and practical feasibility that must be considered 
in litigating an IDEA claim, especially in light of the statute's over­
all purpose. 
The Matthew V. court was the only court to examine the eco­
nomic strain put on parents in the process of litigating an IDEA 
claim. 
[A] brief economic analysis suggests that attorney's fees should 
be available under these circumstances. Even though a parent­
attorney may be his child's most valuable advocate as a parent, as 
an attorney, the parent is subject to opportunity costs inherent in 
performing legal work for her child rather than for a paying 
client.216 
211. Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F.Supp. 2d 1331, 1337-38 (N.D. 
Ga. 2003). 
212. 	 Id. 
213. 	 Id. 
214. Id. at 1338 (discussing the economic and time-management concerns sur­
rounding the parent-attorney IDEA situation). 
215. 	 131 CONGo REc. 31,375 (1985) (statement of Rep. Biaggi). 
216. 	 Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. 
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The court's observation is inherently true, as every hour a parent­
attorney spends researching and litigating his disabled child's 
IDEA claim is another hour not spent with a "paying client."217 
A report conducted in 2003 by the Special Education Expendi­
ture Project (SEEP) provided figures on the costs and the success 
rate of parents litigating IDEA cases.218 The study found that aver­
age litigation expenses for an IDEA claim are approximately 
$95,000.219 Litigation success rates for unrepresented parents 
amounted to only forty-three percent.220 Parents who were repre­
sented by an attorney had an increase in their success rate of any­
where from twenty to twenty-seven percent.221 While retaining an 
attorney obviously helped parents and their disabled children in 
prevailing in their IDEA claims, the financial burden of litigation 
may be too much even for moderately wealthy families, not to men­
tion for lower-or middle-class families. 
Moreover, as an economic and practical concern, attorneys 
may not be readily available given the amount of time and money 
necessary to litigate an IDEA claim.222 This was similar to the 
problem faced by Michael McLaughlin in McLaughlin v. Boston 
School Committee ,223 where the claim was based on racial discrimi­
217. Id. 
218. Daggett, supra note 37, at 25-26. The SEEP is part of the Center for Special 
Education Finance (CSEF). See CSEF/SEEP: Center for Special Education Finance & 
Special Education Expenditure Project, http://www.csef-air.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2009). 
219. JAY G. CHAMBERS, JENIFER J. HARR, AMYNAH DHANANI, SPECIAL EDUC. 
EXPENDITURE PROJECT, WHAT ARE WE SPENDING ON PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN 
SPECIAL EDUCATION, 1999-2000?, at 8, (2003) available at http://csef.air.org/publica 
tions/seep/nationallProcedural %20Safeguards.PD F. 
220. Daggett, supra note 37, at 26. These success rates include cases in which 
parents only partially prevailed. Id. It should also be noted that in most of these cases, 
the parents who represented their child were likely not attorneys. Had they not been 
included, success rates would likely have been higher. Id. 
221. See id. at 24. 
222. See supra Part J.D. Recall the lengthy administrative process that must be 
fulfilled before a claim can even get before a judge. Time and money spent may be 
additionally increased because it often takes significant use of expert witnesses to actu­
ally prove that the school district violated the child's substantive right to a FAPE. See 
Crary, supra note 4, at 968. Crary suggests, 
that the use of expert witnesses in these IDEA actions is both necessary and 
costly. Before filing suit against a school district, special education attorneys 
recommend that parents obtain "strong, believable" expert witness testimony, 
because such testimony, often in the form of evaluations or other recommen­
dations, is generally necessary to rebut a school district's assertion that a child 
is receiving a "free appropriate public education." 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
223. McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 976 F. Supp. 53 (D. Mass. 1997). 
239 2009] THE IDEA OF FAIRNESS 
nation. McLaughlin was forced to proceed himself when he could 
find no attorney to litigate on behalf of his daughter.224 And, like 
the attorneys in Doe, Ford, and Amy M., McLaughlin obtained an 
excellent result for his "client."225 In cases involving civil rights, 
like McLaughlin and the IDEA cases, there are often many more 
violations of children's rights than there are attorneys willing or 
able to litigate to vindicate those rights.226 
Economically and practically, given the litigation costs and the 
risk of losing the case, a parent-attorney may actually be discour­
aged from taking an active role in the education of her child, partic­
ularly if there is no compensation even with success. Such a result 
is clearly contrary to the concern expressed by Congress in discuss­
ing the adoption of the original fee-shifting provision: that disabled 
children should be given the right to a FAPE, and their parents 
should not be disadvantaged in ensuring that right.227 
The policy of denying parent-attorneys their fees in successful 
litigation of IDEA claims is nonsensical because the IDEA and its 
fee-shifting provision were designed specifically to enhance the 
rights of disabled children and involve their parents in the adminis­
trative process. Yet, denying fees discourages those parent-attor­
neys from being involved in their child's education and quite 
possibly could detrimentally affect the child's access to a FAPE. 
CONCLUSION: CONNECfING ALL THE PIECES 
The parent-attorney who wishes to recover attorney's fees in 
representation of her disabled child in an IDEA case has an ardu­
ous task ahead of her. Only one district court has held that fees are 
recoverable, while a host of courts at all levels have held that fees 
may not be awarded.228 What these parent-attorneys have on their 
224. Id. at 65. 
225. Id. ("But for his readiness to proceed personally, plaintiff's complaint might 
never have been filed and her enrollment at BLS [Boston Latin School] never 
achieved."). 
226. See id. 
227. See 131 CONGo REc. 31,376 (1985) (statement of Rep. Miller); supra note 199 
and accompanying text. 
228. See Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 
2003) (the only case to hold that fees may be awarded). The courts that have denied 
fees range from federal appellate courts to state supreme courts. See, e.g., Ford v. Long 
Beach Unified Sch. Dist, 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 
F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998); Rappaport v. 
Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 
N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996). 
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side is the simple fact that Congress clearly did not intend these 
parents to expend vast sums of money and huge amounts of time 
defending the rights of their disabled children without being com­
pensated when they prevail. 
The cases that denied fees were erroneously decided because 
they relied primarily on comparing the situation in the IDEA cases 
to Kay.229 There are significant differences between the factual sit­
uations and the applicable statutes in Kay and the IDEA cases. 
Specifically, parent-attorneys are not acting pro se when represent­
ing their children because they are litigating a claim based on a vio­
lation of their children's substantive rights, not any right they 
themselves possess. Further, concerns over excessively attached or 
emotional representation when parent-attorneys represent their 
children are adequately checked by professional rules of conduct. 
It is contrary to the purpose of the IDEA and basic notions of fair­
ness to request that parent-attorneys, as part of the general parent 
population, take an active role in educating their disabled child and 
then require them to expend not only their own resources, but also 
their time-time that could be used earning money from other cli­
ents-representing their child. 
Further, by examining the actual language of the statute, it be­
comes clear that the IDEA does not prohibit a fee award to parent­
attorneys. As the legislative history demonstrates, the IDEA's fee­
shifting provision is completely different from the original language 
of the HCPA. The 1997 amendments represent a break with the 
original language enacted in the HCPA. Congress was aware of the 
problem with this language, given that both Miller and Rappaport 
had interpreted the provision to deny a fee award.230 Congress 
could have clarified its intent and added language to prohibit 
awards to parent-attorneys, but it did not. This can only be seen as 
an intention to allow the possibility of recovery to remain open to 
parent-attorneys. 
Perhaps the most important reason to allow parent-attorneys 
to recover fees is, in the words of Representative Miller, that 
"[p]arents' involvement in the education of their handicapped child 
is not only essential to the task, it is a right specifically included in 
229. See, e.g., Ford, 461 F.3d at 1090-91; S.N., 448 F.3d at 603-05; Woodside, 248 
F.3d at 131; Doe, 165 F.3d. at 261-63; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611-12; Miller, 665 
N.E.2d at 906-07. 
230. Both cases were decided prior to 1997. See Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 609; 
Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 905. 
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the law."231 The IDEA's goals, disabled children, and their parents 
would all be better served by applying the same general require­
ments for recovery of attorneys' fees to parent-attorneys as to non­
parent attorneys who are representing a disabled child. A parent 
attorney should not be deprived of the statutory right to attorney's 
fees simply because he is acting as both an attorney representing a 
client and a parent trying his best to help his child. 
Justin D. Kumpulanian 
231. 131 CONGo REc. 31,376 (statement of Rep. Miller). 
